Check Point Gateways Hit via PHP2Shell and Zero-Day CVE-2026-123039: Attackers Gain Root, Then Wipe VMware ESXi Hosts — Now in CISA KEV

Attackers chained PHP2Shell with Check Point's DynamicCLI root flaw CVE-2026-123039 to backdoor Mobile Access gateways and, in an Israel-focused first wave, run a wiper on VMware ESXi hosts.
Check Point says attackers have been breaking into unpatched Check Point gateways through their Mobile Access portals since late October. They used the PHP2Shell flaws to get in, then a newly fixed privilege-escalation bug, CVE-2026-123039, to become root. In the first wave they went further: they moved from the gateway to VMware ESXi hosts and ran a wiper that deleted files and left a political note.
On 13 November CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogue. The vendor says it has seen the exploit used against "a couple of dozen customers".
What Happened
Check Point's research team describes two waves of activity:
- Wave one, from 30 October: scanning and exploitation aimed mostly at Israeli organisations. Some of them suffered destructive attacks.
- Wave two, from 2 November: a wider campaign across several countries and sectors, including some of the wave-one victims. No destructive activity has been seen in this wave so far.
Most of the scanning happened between 04:00 and 13:00 Mauritius time (00:00–09:00 UTC). The vendor saw no clear preference for any sector.
PHP2Shell is the name for two critical PHP core flaws, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. They were patched on 21 October and soon exploited at scale against other edge devices. What is new here is the target: Check Point's own gateways, with the attack chain running all the way to data destruction.
Technical Details
The chain has several stages:
- Initial access: PHP2Shell is exploited against the Mobile Access portal's Apache/PHP workers. Signs of attempts include PHP session files with an
upload_progress_pwnmarker and segmentation faults in the portal's worker processes. - Root: CVE-2026-123039 is a missing-authorisation flaw in the DynamicCLI IPC interface. Any authenticated local user can write a single request to its socket and run commands as root.
- Persistence: PHP webshells named
zz*.tplare planted in the template directory the portal uses to build its login pages. They need a hardcoded key and stage uploads at/tmp/.up.tpl. - Backdoors: The attackers install an implant called TSGA (launched as
/tmp/CPconfigdaemon, which later renames itselfslot_CPconfigdaemon) and a shared-library component called TSProxy (/lib/libcpfwcommon.so). TSProxy hooks the appliance's networking functions and hides attacker commands inside normal traffic. Both use TCP port 11072 and the Unix socket/tmp/.p_sock. - Lateral movement: The attackers run the gogo scanner, then use SSH with the
vpxuseraccount to reach VMware ESXi hosts. - Destruction: A wiper called destroy_v6 deletes files recursively whatever their type. By default it overwrites them with zeros first; a fast mode skips that step. It writes a note named
DREAM_ANNEXATION.txtinto every directory it processes.
Check Point says the note is in Hebrew, is politically themed and rejects any ransom negotiation. It uses the brand of Dream Security, a company that had recently published research on PHP2Shell attacks against other firewalls.
Who Is Behind It?
Attribution is unclear. TSGA and TSProxy are modified versions of PhiliKit, a toolkit previously linked to the China-nexus group UNC5221 during Ivanti attacks. The gogo scanner has also been used by China-linked actors, and the operators kept hours typical of a Chinese working day.
But a wiper, a focus on Israel and a Hebrew note do not fit what UNC5221 is known for. Check Point lists several possibilities and does not endorse any of them with high confidence:
- one actor ran the whole campaign
- an initial access broker sold the access on
- the operation is a false flag
- the destruction was a smoke screen for something else
Who Is Affected
The vendor lists Firewall, Security Gateway, Security Management Server, Multi-Domain Security Management Server and Scalable Platforms under advisory sk1000362. Internet-facing gateways with Mobile Access enabled and no PHP2Shell patch are at greatest risk. Gateways that can reach a management network over SSH also put the hypervisors behind them at risk.
Patch Status
Check Point has released emergency hotfixes for CVE-2026-123039. It recommends installing the November Jumbo Hotfix on every Management Server and Security Gateway, starting with those whose Mobile Access portals face the internet. If you cannot patch straight away, the vendor's temporary mitigation is to stop the dynamic_server process and stop it from restarting.
What To Do Now
- Install the November Jumbo Hotfix, or the emergency hotfix from sk1000362, on all gateways and management servers.
- Look in the Mobile Access template directory for unexpected
zz*.tplfiles, and in/tmpfor.up.tpl,CPconfigdaemon,.bd.log,.p_sockanddes wiper. - Check for
/lib/libcpfwcommon.soand for anything listening on TCP port 11072. - Search your logs for connections to the attacker addresses Check Point published: 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168.
- Review ESXi logs for SSH logins as
vpxusercoming from gateway addresses, and look forDREAM_ANNEXATION.txton datastores. - Treat any gateway with these signs as fully compromised. Rebuild it rather than cleaning it, and rotate VPN, admin and ESXi credentials.
- Make sure ESXi backups are offline or immutable, and that gateways cannot reach hypervisor management over SSH.
Why It Matters
Security gateways run with deep trust and little monitoring, so they make ideal beachheads. In this campaign a bug in the PHP language ended with a wiped hypervisor two network hops away. For any organisation still running edge devices on old PHP builds, PHP2Shell is now a proven route to destruction, not only to espionage.
