Cursor Confirms a Stolen Fireworks AI Key Led to Its Breach: Leaked Agent Traces Held Credentials That Let Attackers Push a Backdoored Claude Code Extension to Up to 5,000 Users

AI · 2026-11-15 · By H.A

Cursor Confirms a Stolen Fireworks AI Key Led to Its Breach: Leaked Agent Traces Held Credentials That Let Attackers Push a Backdoored Claude Code Extension to Up to 5,000 Users

Cursor says attackers used a stolen Fireworks AI key to copy coding-agent traces containing unredacted credentials, then used those credentials to plant backdoored Claude Code extension versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 in its marketplace.

Cursor, the AI code editor, has confirmed that the backdoored copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension pushed to its users on 29 October were the result of a wider breach of its own systems. In an incident report published on Friday 14 November 2026, the company said attackers first got in with an access key stolen from its AI model provider, Fireworks AI. They then copied historical coding-agent traces containing unredacted credentials and used those credentials to reach more internal systems, including the extension marketplace.

What's New

When the malicious extension builds appeared at the start of November, the obvious question was how attackers had managed to publish them through Cursor's marketplace. Cursor's report answers that. It also shows the incident was bigger than one poisoned extension:

The Malicious Extension

On 29 October, attackers used a stolen credential to place modified versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of the Claude Code extension on the cache that serves Cursor's VS Code-compatible extension marketplace. The builds were available for about 11 hours before removal.

According to Cursor and researchers who analysed the builds, the injected JavaScript:

Coding errors in the payload probably stopped the backdoor from working on many Windows and macOS machines where SSH wasn't already enabled. Linux machines, and any machine with SSH already running, face more risk.

Cursor estimates that up to 5,000 users requested the affected versions during that window. Anthropic's own extension and the Open VSX registry Cursor uses were not compromised. The tampering happened inside Cursor's cache layer.

Scale of the Data Exposure

Cursor says fewer than 0.05% of users had coding-agent traces exposed, and fewer than 0.01% of customers had API credentials compromised. It says production infrastructure, official application releases, customer code repositories, and code and prompts from Privacy Mode users were not affected.

What Cursor Did

Who Is Affected

What To Do Now

# Linux / macOS: review authorised keys and SSH service state
cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
systemctl status ssh sshd 2>/dev/null   # Linux
sudo systemsetup -getremotelogin         # macOS
# Windows: is the OpenSSH server installed or running?
Get-Service sshd -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Get-Content $env:ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Why It Matters

This is a clear example of a supply-chain chain reaction in the AI tooling stack. A breach at a cloud provider led to a breach at a model host. That breach exposed agent traces at an AI editor, and the secrets in those traces opened the editor's marketplace, which pushed a backdoor to thousands of developers. Coding-agent logs are full of pasted API keys, environment variables and tokens, and they often sit with third-party inference providers. They have become one of the most valuable things an attacker can steal. Anyone using AI coding tools should treat agent transcripts as sensitive data, keep secrets out of prompts, and rotate anything that has passed through a provider that has now disclosed a breach.

REEF SENTINEL