AI Agents Found a Zero-Day in 11 Minutes: China-Linked Cairn Operator Rooted a University Server via MONAI Label CVE-2026-133968 (CVSS 9.8), and the First Fixed Release, 0.8.6, Shipped Today

Critical · 2026-11-22 · By H.A

AI Agents Found a Zero-Day in 11 Minutes: China-Linked Cairn Operator Rooted a University Server via MONAI Label CVE-2026-133968 (CVSS 9.8), and the First Fixed Release, 0.8.6, Shipped Today

Amazon says autonomous Cairn AI agents found and exploited an unauthenticated path traversal in the MONAI Label medical-imaging server to get root on a university server, and the first patched package, 0.8.6, was released on 22 November.

Overview

Amazon Threat Intelligence has published the first detailed account of autonomous AI agents finding a previously unknown vulnerability during a live intrusion campaign and then using it to take over a server. The flaw is in MONAI Label, an open-source server that research hospitals and universities use to label medical images and train AI models on them. It is now tracked as CVE-2026-133968 (CVSS 9.8). The agents were run through Cairn, an open-source AI penetration-testing framework, by an operator Amazon links to China with moderate confidence. Their brief was simply to "obtain shell access".

The new development today: the MONAI Label maintainers shipped version 0.8.6 at 05:29 Mauritius time on 22 November (01:29 UTC 22 November). It is the first packaged release on PyPI and Docker that contains the fix. Until then, the code fix had been sitting on the project's main branch since October, but anyone who installed the server with pip install monailabel was still getting the vulnerable 0.8.5, which dates from 2023.

The Vulnerability

The project's security advisory (GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94) describes a path traversal (CWE-24) in the datastore upload endpoints:

All versions up to and including 0.8.5 are affected. The flaw is especially dangerous because MONAI Label ships with authentication disabled by default (MONAI_LABEL_AUTH_ENABLE=False). Any client that can reach the port can therefore reach both bugs, with no credentials and no user interaction.

The Campaign

According to Amazon, the operator left their Cairn server online without authentication. That exposed project settings, prompts and the agents' output to anyone who found it. Prompts were written in Simplified Chinese and script timestamps were set to China Standard Time. Over roughly 48 hours, the campaign targeted IP ranges belonging to universities in East Asia outside mainland China.

Most operations failed, but they show how persistent agents can be:

The medical-imaging target was different. The agents fingerprinted the framework, mapped its API and spotted an upload endpoint with a filename parameter. They tested it for path traversal and had arbitrary file write about 11 minutes after they started mapping the API.

Timeline

Tradecraft

To turn the file write into code execution, the agents wrote a Python reverse shell into sitecustomize.py, a file the Python interpreter imports automatically every time it starts. They then called MONAI Label's training API, which starts a new Python process. That process loaded the payload and connected back to the attacker as root, which shows the server was running with full privileges.

The human operator then stepped in. They gave the agents a proxy that tunnelled into a second university network. Amazon infers that the proxy ran on another MONAI Label server the operator had already compromised with the same bug, and the agents were told to attack other machines from there. Amazon also notes that a separate, financially motivated group has been documented using Cairn against online retailers, which suggests the framework is being adopted for both espionage and crime.

Indicators of Compromise

Amazon published two addresses seen in records dated 8–10 September 2026:

These are months old and were probably short-lived infrastructure, so treat them as useful for retro-hunting rather than blocking.

Detection

pip show monailabel | grep -i ^version
python3 -c "import site,sys; print(site.getsitepackages(), sys.prefix)"
find / \( -name 'sitecustomize.py' -o -name 'usercustomize.py' \) -mtime -90 -ls 2>/dev/null
grep -E 'PUT /(datastore|session)' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -Ei '\.\./|%2e%2e|\.\.%2f'

Recommended Actions

Analyst Assessment

The bug itself is a classic path traversal. What makes this case significant is who found it. An unattended agent framework discovered and weaponised a real zero-day in minutes, and then kept working tirelessly through targets that didn't give way. Research software built for trusted lab networks, with authentication off by default, is exactly the kind of under-watched target these agents will keep finding.

The patch timeline also deserves attention. Users who relied on PyPI or Docker had no fixed build for more than two months after the code fix landed, and for four days after the advisory was published. Defenders should expect agent-driven discovery to shorten the time between "unknown" and "exploited" further. That makes exposure reduction and automated detection more valuable than waiting for a patch.

Sources

REEF SENTINEL