tcherber Sells FortiGate VPN Access: 500+ Stolen Logins, a Go Recon Toolkit and Rust HVNC, Stealer and ENIGMA Ransomware Tied to One Operator, With 178 Bots Still Live

High · 2026-11-18 · By H.A

tcherber Sells FortiGate VPN Access: 500+ Stolen Logins, a Go Recon Toolkit and Rust HVNC, Stealer and ENIGMA Ransomware Tied to One Operator, With 178 Bots Still Live

Researchers expose a Russian-speaking access broker whose leaked files hold 500+ FortiGate VPN credentials, an automated Go VPN-and-AD recon toolkit, and Rust stealer, HVNC and ENIGMA ransomware run from a still-active panel.

Overview

Security researchers published a detailed report on 17 November 2026 about a Russian-speaking operator called tcherber who runs two businesses at once: selling access to corporate networks through stolen or guessed FortiGate SSL VPN logins, and building malware for sale. The operator's own exposed files included a Go toolkit that automates VPN logins and internal reconnaissance, a database of more than 500 FortiGate VPN credential entries, and logs showing successful tunnels into several victim networks in May and June 2026.

The same operator is tied to a set of Rust tools: a loader, an information stealer, a hidden-desktop (HVNC) remote access implant and a ransomware strain called ENIGMA Locker. An unauthenticated control panel run by the operator showed 178 active infected machines at the time it was examined, with new agent builds dated September 2026. The researchers say the infrastructure was still live when they wrote the report.

There is no new FortiGate vulnerability here. The way in is weak and reused VPN credentials, which makes this a configuration and identity problem that every FortiGate owner can check today.

The Campaign

The Go toolkit is a small attack framework. An orchestrator (labelled v2.2, "DEBUG MODE") chains these modules:

The credential file stores entries as ip:port:login:password across several countries. It mixes default pairs such as guest/guest, admin/admin and test/test with organisation-specific passwords. That points to two sources: brute-forcing and credentials taken from earlier dumps. A separate list targeted SonicWall devices, but every intrusion documented in the logs involved FortiGate.

On a Russian-language forum, the operator advertised access to victims in the USA, Canada and Europe, priced by company revenue (above or below $10 million) and by organisation type, and explicitly excluded CIS countries. The report does not name the victims or their sectors.

Timeline

Tradecraft

The attribution rests on careless build hygiene. Rust panic strings in the payloads leaked the build path /home/tcherber/, and the Go toolkit points to a Go 1.25.3 toolchain under the same home folder. Earlier public research had already tied that path to the Zer0day Stealer, HVNC tooling and ENIGMA Locker.

The malware chain the researchers analysed works like this:

The researchers say plainly that the evidence does not prove ENIGMA Locker was deployed in the documented VPN intrusions. The ransomware is linked to the same operator, not to those specific victims.

Indicators of Compromise

Detection

On FortiGate, look in the VPN event logs for:

On endpoints and in the SIEM, hunt for:

A quick PowerShell check for the persistence names:

Get-ItemProperty 'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' |
  Select-Object SecurityHealth,WindowsUpdate,EnigmaUpdater,SystemRestoreAgent
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object TaskName -in 'S0','MU','Upd','WindowsUpdate'
(Get-MpPreference).ExclusionPath

Recommended Actions

config vpn ssl settings
    set login-attempt-limit 2
    set login-block-time 300
    set source-address <allowed-countries-or-hosts>
end

Analyst Assessment

tcherber is a mid-level actor, not an elite one. The work is reasonably capable, with fileless loading, AMSI and ETW patching and a solid ransomware design, but the operational security is poor: leaked build paths and a control panel open to anyone. The more important lesson is the business model. One person sells initial access and also supplies the tools for what happens next, and 500 VPN logins are enough to keep that model running. Default and reused credentials on edge VPNs are still one of the cheapest ways into a network. Because the panel was active in November, defenders should assume the access-selling continues. We rate this High: there is no software flaw to patch, so the fix depends entirely on credential hygiene and MFA that many organisations still lack.

Sources

REEF SENTINEL