Operation CloudFire: Google Calendar Invites From Trusted Senders Steal Live Google Sessions Past MFA — 8,570 Compromised Accounts Sent Lures, 897 Phishing Domains Taken Down

High · 2026-11-15 · By H.A

Operation CloudFire: Google Calendar Invites From Trusted Senders Steal Live Google Sessions Past MFA — 8,570 Compromised Accounts Sent Lures, 897 Phishing Domains Taken Down

A Nyasher-powered reverse-proxy campaign running since mid-August uses Google's own redirector and browser-built login pages to relay passwords, SMS codes and number matching, then reuses each victim's account to phish their contacts.

Overview

Since mid-August 2026, a phishing operation has been stealing live, authenticated Google sessions from corporate users. Its lures are Google Calendar invites, and later Google Drive share notifications. They arrive from real, previously trusted accounts. Victims are passed through a reverse proxy placed in front of Google's genuine sign-in page. The operator relays the password and the second factor to Google in real time and keeps the resulting session.

Email security researchers ran a takedown effort they call Operation CloudFire and published fresh details this week. In one month, from a subset of customers who agreed to share data, they counted:

The real totals are likely higher.

The Campaign

The invites use pretexts that make people act fast: voicemail notices, RFP or RFI requests, court summonses and missed-payment alerts. Many are sent by BCC. They usually come from organisations the recipient already corresponds with, because each victim's account is used to mail its own saved contacts. That is how the campaign spreads from one company to its partners and suppliers.

The link chain is built to pass every reputation check:

The capture page is a live reverse proxy run with Nyasher, a phishing framework that has been publicly documented since February 2026 after researchers found a hard-coded key in its JavaScript. Because the real Google page is relayed, the operator can pass along:

None of these stopped session capture. The operator also built an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch alongside the Google code, so a switch of target is a real possibility.

Timeline

All times are Mauritius time (UTC+4), with UTC in brackets.

Tradecraft

Detection

The researchers did not publish domain or IP indicators in their public write-up, so detection has to rely on behaviour:

# Example using the open-source GAM tool for Google Workspace (adjust dates)
gam report login start -7d                    # recent login events with IP addresses
gam report token start -7d                    # OAuth grants and revocations
gam user <user@example.com> show tokens       # apps currently holding tokens for a user

Recommended Actions

Analyst Assessment

This campaign shows that adversary-in-the-middle phishing has matured. It combines trusted senders, Google-owned redirectors and pages built only in the browser, which defeats the reputation, link-analysis and crawling controls most organisations depend on. SMS codes, app codes and number matching all fell to live relay.

The takedown raised the operator's costs, but rebuilding is cheap, the framework is public and a Microsoft 365 module is already half-built. Expect the same playbook to return under a different brand and lure. Phishing-resistant MFA plus fast session and OAuth revocation is the durable answer.

REEF SENTINEL