Apify Breach: One Compromised Credential Led to Customer Data, With 2FA Recovery Codes and GitHub and Google Sign-In Tokens Reportedly Exposed

The Czech web-scraping platform, which says it has about 91,000 customers, confirmed an attacker accessed internal systems and customer data on 9–10 November 2026 and has rotated secrets and revoked some OAuth connections.
Overview
Apify, a Czech web-scraping and automation platform that says it has about 91,000 customers, has confirmed that an attacker accessed customer data and internal systems. The intrusion took place on 9–10 November 2026 and was found on 11 November. It started with one compromised credential that the attacker used to collect more credentials and reach connected accounts.
Apify has not said how many accounts were affected. A customer notice shared publicly, which has not been independently verified, lists data that includes 2FA recovery codes and authentication tokens for Google and GitHub sign-ins. That would make this more than a typical contact-data leak.
The Incident
According to Apify's status page and statements:
- An attacker used a compromised credential to obtain more credentials, which gave access to related Apify accounts and internal systems.
- Some customers' personal information or stored data was accessed.
- Customers who have not received a notice have not been identified as affected so far, but the investigation is still running.
The customer notice that circulated says exposed data may include:
- Names, email addresses, billing details, account activity and IP addresses
- Salted password hashes
- 2FA recovery codes and phone numbers
- Authentication tokens tied to Google and GitHub sign-ins
- Partial card data: cardholder name, expiry date and last four digits. Full card numbers and CVVs were not exposed.
Timeline
All dates are Mauritius time (UTC+4). Apify has not published exact hours.
- 9–10 November 2026 – intrusion takes place.
- 11 November 2026 – Apify detects the intrusion, blocks the attacker and starts an investigation.
- 12 November 2026 – Apify confirms on its status page that customer data was accessed. Affected customers start receiving notices.
- 13 November 2026 – the incident is reported publicly. No threat actor has claimed it.
Tradecraft
The publicly known pattern is credential chaining: one valid secret is used to find others (in config, CI variables, vaults or internal tools) until the attacker reaches systems holding customer data. How the first credential was obtained has not been disclosed. Infostealer logs, phishing and leaked secrets in code are the usual sources for this kind of entry.
The data reportedly taken makes follow-on abuse possible:
- 2FA recovery codes can bypass a user's second factor if paired with a cracked or reused password.
- OAuth tokens for GitHub and Google could give access to linked repositories or accounts until they are revoked. This matters for Apify users who build scrapers ("Actors") from private GitHub repositories.
- Account and billing details make targeted phishing look convincing.
Vendor Response
Apify says it has:
- Blocked the attacker and added monitoring
- Rotated critical internal secrets
- Revoked some OAuth connections to third-party services, including GitHub
- Asked customers who build Actors from private GitHub repositories to reconnect their GitHub integration
Apify says it has found no evidence that the OAuth connections were the attack vector.
Detection
For Apify customers and security teams:
- GitHub: check the organisation and user security logs for OAuth-app activity, clones of private repositories, new deploy keys or new personal access tokens since 9 November.
- Google Workspace: review third-party app access and token grants for the Apify app, and sign-ins from unfamiliar IPs.
- Apify account: look for unknown API tokens, new Actors or schedules, changed webhooks, or Actor runs you didn't start.
- Secrets inside Actors: any API keys, proxy credentials or cookies stored as Actor input or environment variables should be treated as exposed.
# GitHub CLI: list recent org audit-log events tied to OAuth/integration access (requires org admin)
gh api "/orgs/YOUR_ORG/audit-log?phrase=action:oauth_access+created:>=2026-11-09" --paginate | jq '.[] | {action, actor, created_at}'
Recommended Actions
- Change your Apify password and generate new 2FA recovery codes. The old ones may be exposed.
- Rotate Apify API tokens and reconnect GitHub and Google integrations as Apify advises.
- Rotate third-party secrets stored in Actors or task inputs: target-site credentials, proxy keys, cloud keys and webhook secrets.
- If you reused your Apify password anywhere else, change it there too.
- Watch for phishing that uses your real account or billing details. Apify will not ask for your password or recovery codes by email.
Analyst Assessment
Developer and automation platforms are attractive targets because they hold other people's secrets. A scraping platform's customers routinely store credentials for the sites and APIs they automate. That makes the downstream impact potentially larger than the 91,000 headline number suggests, and it depends heavily on what each customer kept in their Actors. The reported exposure of 2FA recovery codes is the detail to act on fastest. Apify's quick detection, within roughly a day, limited the attacker's time inside. Customers should still assume any secret stored on the platform before 11 November is burned and rotate it.
